Ontogeny versus Phylogeny

Biological development involves both ontogenetic and phylogenetic considerations. Thus, the development of specific traits, such as the opposable thumb in humans, can be viewed both from the point of view of the development of that trait in individual organisms (ontogeny) and the development of that trait in the human lineage (phylogeny). The development of knowledge and knowing mechanisms exhibits a parallel distinction. We can consider the growth of an individual's corpus of knowledge and epistemological norms or his or her brain (ontogeny) or the growth of human knowledge and establishment of epistemological norms across generations or the development of brains in the human lineage (phylogeny). The EEM/EET distinction cuts across this distinction since we may be concerned either with the ontogenetic or phylogenetic development of, e.g., the brain or the ontogenetic or phylogenetic development of norms and knowledge corpora. One might expect that since current orthodoxy maintains that biological processes of ontogenesis proceed differently from the selectionist processes of phylogenesis, evolutionary epistemologies would reflect this difference. Curiously enough, however, for the most part they do not. For example, the theory of “neural Darwinism” as put forth by Edelman (1987) and Changeaux (1985) offers a selectionist account of the ontogenetic development of the neural structures of the brain. Karl Popper's conjectures and refutations model of the development of human knowledge is a well known example of a selectionist account which has been applied both to the ontogenetic growth of knowledge in individuals as well as the trans-generational (phylogenetic) evolution of scientific knowledge. B. F. Skinner's theory of operant conditioning, which deals with the ontogenesis of individual behavior, is explicitly based upon the Darwinian selectionist model (Skinner 1981).

1.3 Descriptive versus Prescriptive Approaches

A third distinction concerns descriptive versus prescriptive approaches to epistemology and the growth of human knowledge. Traditionally, epistemology has been construed as a normative project whose aim is to clarify and defend conceptions of knowledge, foundations, evidential warrant and justification. Many have argued that neither the EEM programs nor the EET programs have anything at all to do with epistemology properly (i. e., traditionally) understood. The basis for this contention is that epistemology, properly understood, is a normative discipline, whereas the EEM and EET programs are concerned with the construction of causal and genetic (i.e., descriptive) models of the evolution of cognitive capacities or knowledge systems. No such models, it is alleged, can have anything important to contribute to normative epistemology (e.g., Kim 1988). The force of this complaint depends upon how one construes the relationship between evolutionary epistemology and the tradition.
There are three possible configurations of the relationship between descriptive and traditional epistemologies. (1) Descriptive epistemologies can be construed as competitors to traditional normative epistemologies. On this view, both are trying to address the same concerns and offering competing solutions. Riedl (1984) defends this position. A standard objection to such approaches is that descriptive accounts are not adequate to do justice to the prescriptive elements of normative methodologies. The extent to which an evolutionary approach contributes to the resolution of traditional epistemological and philosophical problems is a function of which approach one adopts (cf. Dretske 1971, Bradie 1986, Ruse 1986, Radnitsky and Bartley 1987, Kim 1988). (2) Descriptive epistemology might be seen as a successor discipline to traditional epistemology. On this reading, descriptive epistemology does not address the questions of traditional epistemology because it deems them irrelevant or unanswerable or uninteresting. Many defenders of naturalized epistemologies fall into this camp (e.g., Munz 1993). (3) Descriptive epistemology might be seen as complementary to traditional epistemology. This appears to be Campbell's view. On this analysis, the function of the evolutionary approach is to provide a descriptive account of knowing mechanisms while leaving the prescriptive aspects of epistemology to more traditional approaches. At best, the evolutionary analyses serve to rule out normative approaches which are either implausible or inconsistent with an evolutionary origin of human understanding.

1.4 Future Prospects

EEM programs are saddled with the typical uncertainties of phylogenetic reconstructions. Is this or that organ or structure an adaptation and if so, for what? In addition, there are the uncertainties which result from the necessarily sparse fossil record of brain and sensory organ development. The EET programs are even more problematic. While it is plausible enough to think that the evolutionary imprint on our organs of thought influences what and how we do think, it is not at all clear that the influence is direct, significant or detectible. Selectionist epistemologies which endorse a “trial and error” methodology as an appropriate model for understanding scientific change are not analytic consequences of accepting that the brain and other ancillary organs are adaptations which have evolved primarily under the influence of natural selection. The viability of such selectionist models is an empirical question which rests on the development of adequate models. Hull's (1988) is, as he himself admits, but the first step in that direction. Cziko (1995) is a manifesto urging the development of such models (cf. also the evolutionary game theory modeling approach of Harms 1997). Much hard empirical work needs to be done to sustain this line of research. Non-selectionist evolutionary epistemologies, along the lines of Ruse (1986), face a different range of difficulties. It remains to be shown that any biological considerations are sufficiently restrictive to narrow down the range of potential methodologies in any meaningful way. A non-selectionist approach to evolutionary epistemology, based on “Poincaréan dynamics,” has been proposed by Barham (1990). A critical review of the problems facing the development of the naturalistic turn in evolutionary epistemology can be found in Callebaut and Stotz (1998).
Nevertheless, the emergence in the latter quarter of the twentieth century of serious efforts to provide an evolutionary account of human understanding has potentially radical consequences. The application of selectionist models to the development of human knowledge, for example, creates an immediate tension. Standard traditional accounts of the emergence and growth of scientific knowledge see science as a progressive enterprise which, under the appropriate conditions of rational and free inquiry, generates a body of knowledge which progressively converges on the truth. Selectionist models of biological evolution, on the other hand, are generally construed to be non-progressive or, at most, locally so. Rather than generating convergence, biological evolution produces diversity. Popper's evolutionary epistemology attempts to embrace both but does so uneasily. Kuhn's “scientific revolutions” account draws tentatively upon a Darwinian model, but when criticized, Kuhn retreated (cf. Kuhn 1972, pp. 172f with Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, p. 264). Toulmin (1972) is a noteworthy exception. On his account, concepts of rationality are purely “local” and are themselves subject to evolution. This, in turn, seems to entail the need to abandon any sense of “goal directedness” in scientific inquiry. This is a radical consequence which few have embraced. Pursuing an evolutionary approach to epistemology raises fundamental questions about the concepts of knowledge, truth, realism, justification and rationality.

» Hawking versus Dieu

Ontogeny versus Phylogeny

1.3 Descriptive versus Prescriptive Approaches

1.4 Future Prospects

Ontogeny versus Phylogeny :: تعاليق

Ontogeny versus Phylogeny

مواضيع مماثلة

مواضيع مماثلة