Les êtres humains sont en effet entourés d’une aura mystérieuse, mais ce n’est pas une mystique lueur éthérée. C’est un nuage personnel de microbes qui proviennent de notre bouche, de notre peau et de nos excréments et des chercheurs ont découvert comment celui-ci peut nous identifier, une empreinte bactérienne inattendue.
Tout le monde sait que lorsque vous avez vraiment envie de faire pipi, il est difficile de se concentrer sur autre chose. Au lieu de cela, votre self-control sera consacré à ne pas mouiller votre pantalon. Il se trouve que de concentrer la maîtrise de vous même sur votre vessie a un effet secondaire intéressant : il vous rend également mieux à même de...
Environ 60% de toutes les maladies humaines et quelque 75% de toutes les maladies infectieuses émergentes sont deszoonoses, ce qui signifie qu’elles se propagent...
La semaine dernière, la NASA, via un communiqué de presse, a déclaré qu’elle dévoilerait une “découverte scientifique majeure” qui résout un vieux mystère martien. Après un week-end...
Cette semaine, la NASA à confirmé l’existence de flux d’eau saisonnier sur la surface de Mars, ce qui est non seulement extrêmement importante pour les perspectives de trouver de la vie ailleurs dans notre système solaire, mais ces conclusions seront également cruciales pour de futures recherche sur Mars, y compris le scénario éventuel qu’un jour l’humain s’y rende et même, peut-être, y vive…
As we have seen, there are some who deny that ordinary composite objects exist, and we have examined some of their reasons for embracing one or another form of eliminativism. But there are also some who grant that ordinary objects exist but deny that they exist fundamentally. This is an importantly different claim, which can be spelled out in either of two importantly different ways.[size=12][
The material constitution puzzles from §2.3 can be repurposed as arguments against two forms of permissivism: universalism and the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts (DAUP). The basic idea behind both arguments is that permissivists end up committed to objects that are...
Universalism seems to conflict with our intuitive judgment that the front halves of trout and the back halves of turkeys do not compose anything. Put another way, universalism seems to be open to fairly obvious counterexamples. Here is an argument from counterexamples against...
We encounter some atoms arranged treewise and some atoms arranged dogwise, and we naturally take there to be a dog and a tree. But there are different ways we might have carved up such a situation into objects. Instead of taking there to be a tree there, we might instead have taken there to be a trog—a partly furry, partly wooden object composed of the dog and the tree-trunk.
Ordinary objects are constituted by, or made up out of, aggregates of matter. A gold ring is constituted by a certain piece of gold. Clay statues are constituted by pieces of clay. We are naturally inclined to regard the statue and the piece of clay as being one and the same object, an object that simply belongs to multiple kinds (statue and piece of clay).
Permissive views are those according to which there are wide swathes of highly visible extraordinary objects, right before our eyes. Universalism is the permissivist thesis that composition is unrestricted: for any objects, there is a single object that is composed of those objects. What universalism does not tell us is whichkinds of objects...
Our everyday experiences present us with a wide array of objects: dogs and cats, tables and chairs, trees and their branches, and so forth. These sorts of ordinary objects may seem fairly unproblematic in comparison to entities like numbers, propositions, tropes, holes, points of space, and moments of time. Yet, on closer inspection, they are at least as puzzling, if not more so. Reflection on Michelangelo’s David and the piece of marble of which it is made threatens to lead to the surprising conclusion...
Given what we now know about infinitary languages, it would seem that L(ω[size=12]1,ω) is the only one to be reasonably well behaved. On the other hand, the failure of the compactness theorem to generalize to L(ω1,ω) in any useful fashion is a severe drawback as far as applications are concerned. Let us attempt to analyze this failure in more detail.[/size] Recall from §4 that we may code...
As we have seen, the compactness theorem in its usual form fails for all infinitary languages. Nevertheless, it is of some interest to determine whether infinitary languages satisfy some suitably modified version of the theorem. This so-called compactness problem turns out to have a natural connection with purely set-theoretic questions involving “large” cardinal numbers. We construct the following definition. Let κ be an infinite cardinal....
We have remarked that infinite-quantifier languages such as L(ω[size=12]1,ω1) resemble second-order languages inasmuch as they allow quantification over infinite sets of individuals. The fact that this is not permitted in finite-quantifier languages suggests that these may be in certain respects closer to their first-order counterparts than might be evident at first sight. We shall see that this is indeed the case, notably in the case of L(ω
Traditionally, expressions in formal systems have been regarded as signifying finite inscriptions which are—at least in principle—capable of actually being written out in primitive notation. However, the fact that (first-order) formulas may be identified with natural numbers (via “Gödel numbering”) and hence with finite sets makes it no longer necessary to regard formulas as inscriptions, and suggests the possibility of fashioning “languages” some of whose formulas would be naturally identified as infinite...
Putting his anti-materialist argument outlined above, in section 1, in very general terms, Aristotle's worry was that a material organ could not have the range and flexibility that are required for human thought. His worries concerned the cramping effect that matter would have on the range of objects that intellect could accommodate. Parallel modern concerns centre on the...
All the arguments so far in this section have been either arguments for property dualism only, or neutral between property and substance dualism. In this subsection, and in section 4.5 we will consider some arguments that have been proposed in favour of substance dualism.The ones in this section can be regarded as preliminaries to that in 4.5 and they centre on discontent with property...
There is an argument, which has roots in Descartes (Meditation VI), which is a modal argument for dualism. One might put it as follows: [list="margin-top: 0.5em; color: rgb(26, 26, 26); font-family: serif; font-size: 16.5px; line-height: 21px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"] [*]It is imaginable that one's mind might exist without one's body. therefore
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