Fundamental Existents

Fundamental Existents

As we have seen, there are some who deny that ordinary composite objects exist, and we have examined some of their reasons for embracing one or another form of eliminativism. But there are also some who grant that ordinary objects exist but deny that they exist fundamentally. This is an importantly different claim, which can be spelled out in either of two importantly different ways.[77]
First, one might deny that any ordinary composite objects are fundamental, that is, one can insist that there is something in which they are grounded. Even those who think that ordinary objects exist will likely find it natural to suppose that no ordinary composites are fundamental: all ordinary composites are ultimately going to be grounded in their simple microscopic parts.[78]
On the second understanding of the claim that ordinary objects do not exist fundamentally, the idea is that they are not in the domain of a fundamental quantifier, where the fundamental quantifiers are the quantifiers that appear in the best correct and complete theory of the world. To help see how the two understandings of “exists fundamentally” can come apart, notice that the identity relation is plausibly fundamental (appearing in the best theory of the world), despite the fact that it relates every object—including nonfundamental objects—to itself. A relation can be fundamental without dragging everything in its extension into the fundamental level with it. Similarly, even if the ordinary existential quantifier is a fundamental quantifier, that does not obviously entail that everything in its domain (namely: everything) is fundamental as well.[79]
Even so, one might deny that the ordinary existential quantifier is a fundamental quantifier on grounds of parsimony. Explanations involving quantifiers whose domains include nonfundamental objects (the idea goes) will be less parsimonious than explanations involving quantifiers whose domains include only fundamental objects. And since the ordinary existential quantifier includes nonfundamental objects (e.g., ordinary composites), it will be less fundamental than restricted quantifiers ranging only over fundamental objects.[80]
How do these stances on fundamentality—that ordinary objects are not fundamental or are not in the domain of fundamental quantifiers—compare to the eliminativist theses discussed above? Although there is a superficial resemblance, the differences are manifest when we consider how the views interact with the arguments against conservatism in §2. Eliminativists, who say that ordinary objects do not exist, can accept AV5, DK4, OD5, SR4, and ST8 and can reject AR1, MC1, and PM3 in the arguments above, since the latter affirm, and the former deny, the existence of ordinary objects. But those who are willing to deny only that ordinary objects existfundamentally (in one or the other sense) must find some other way of addre

Fundamental Existents

Fundamental Existents

Fundamental Existents :: تعاليق

Fundamental Existents