Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (c. 870–950), known in the Arabic philosophical tradition as the “Second Master” (al-mu‘allim al-thānī) after Aristotle, and Alpharabius/Alfarabi in the Latin West tradition, is one of the major thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. He wrote extensively on logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, natural philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, philosophical psychology and epistemology. His teachings had a strong Aristotelian background and at the same time a significant Neoplatonic bent. One of the greatest Islamic thinkers, Avicenna (d. 1037), explicitly admits in his autobiography his intellectual debt to al-Fārābī through whom he was able to understand the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Overall, al-Fārābī became an important reference within the Islamic intellectual milieu as a source of both influence and contention.
The precise chronology of al-Fārābī’s works is difficult to establish. He wrote treatises devoted to the explanation of Plato and Aristotle, commentaries and paraphrases of Aristotle’s works, and other treatises where he develops his own philosophical thought unifying his metaphysical and cosmological views with his psychology, and even with his political philosophy. His views concerning psychological and epistemological matters appear in several places within his treatises. Hence, it is necessary to consider several works where he clarifies and completes his thoughts on the matter. The Principles of Existing Things, also known as The Political Regime(Kitāb al-siyāsa al-madaniyya), and The Principles and Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City (Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīnah al-fāḍilah), are some of al-Fārābī’s major works where he deals with psychological topics such as the nature of the soul, its cognitive capacities, and the doctrine of the intellect. Furthermore, there is another important treatise where al-Fārābī directly deals with the intellective faculty, namely, The Treatise on the Intellect (Risālah fi’l-‘aql). This work shows signs of the influence of Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul and its interpretation by Alexander of Aphrodisias. In fact, M. Geoffroy (2002: 191–231) contends that al-Fārābī probably never read a complete translation of Aristotle’s On the Soul but knew it through Alexander’s treatises, mainly the On the Intellect. Al-Fārābī addresses epistemological topics such as the understanding of scientific knowledge and the nature of demonstration and certitude mainly in the Book of Demonstration (Kitāb al-burhān) and the Book on the Conditions of Certitude (Kitāb Šara’iṭ al-yaqīn). In order to cover the diversity of psychological and epistemological matters in al-Fārābī’s works, this article is divided as follows:Academic Tools
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[size=30]1. The Origin and Nature of the Soul
In one of his best-known introductory works,
Enumeration of the Sciences (
Iḥṣā’ al-Ulūm), al-Fārābī (ES: 87) explains that the eighth part of the science of physics is devoted to what is common to the different kinds of animals, namely, the soul, and is studied in Aristotle’s
Book of Animals and in
On the Soul. Al-Fārābī describes the soul as Aristotle did in
On the Soul 2.1, 412a19, that is, as the form or actualization (ἐντελέχεια /
antalāshiyā or
at-tamām) of a natural organic body that potentially has life.
[1] Living beings have different faculties: the nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, and rational faculties. The presence of these capacities in living beings is due to the different kinds of soul. The origin of these souls and their capacities is explained by al-Fārābī from a metaphysical, cosmological, and biological perspective.
In fact, al-Fārābī’s entire philosophy, including his psychological and epistemological views, must be understood in light of his ontological and cosmological worldview, a matter that has been a source of considerable debate. In
The Political Regime and
The Virtuous City, al-Fārābī provides a metaphysical and ontological explanation of the structure of the universe, combining Neoplatonic emanationism and Aristotelian views on the celestial spheres (M. Mahdi 2001: 6–11; 121–124). Others have argued that al-Fārābī’s account concerning these matters in both treatises should not be taken literally, but as a political metaphor of the kind of regimes that can be conceived in political philosophy. In contrast, P. Vallat and D. Janos have rejected this view and have shown that far from a mere rhetorical strategy, al-Fārābī’s cosmology constitutes the foundation of his political thought. Though these different approaches have motivated controversial interpretations of al-Fārābī’s philosophy, this article concurs with the interpretation of Vallat (2004: 85–128) and Janos (2012: 38–43). To take al-Fārābī’s cosmology as a true component of his philosophy has serious implications for the understanding of his philosophical psychology: al-Fārābī’s conception of the soul and intellect cannot be understood without taking into account his cosmological model. In this way it becomes clear that his psychology and cosmology taken together motivate his political philosophy.
As D. Janos (2010: 19–44) has shown in depth, al-Fārābī’s cosmology draws on the
Proclus Arabus (mainly the
Maḥd al-khayr [
Elements of Theology]), late ancient commentators such as Alexander, Simplicius, Themistius, and in general from the
Neoplatonica Arabica, including the
Plotinus Arabus (Janos 2012: 4–6; 11–37; D’Ancona 2014). Both
The Political Regime and
The Virtuous City are key sources for the reconstruction of al-Fārābī’s cosmology which consists in a hierarchical emanationist model constituted by six principles: (1) the First Existent or First Cause, (2) the second intellects, (3) the active (or agent) intellect, (4) the soul, (5) form, and (6) matter (al-Fārābī KS: 31; PR: 29). The First Cause is one and unique, precluding any multiplicity, whereas all other principles are multiple. The first three principles are not bodies, nor are in a body; they are immaterial and separate, whereas the three last principles are not bodies but are connected to the bodies. Notice that the soul is one of the principles that will be originated through the emanative process and is described as a principle that is not a body in itself but is in a body. Al-Fārābī explains that the universe contains six kinds of body. In decreasing order of perfection, there are: (1) celestial bodies, (2) rational animals, (3) non-rational animals, (4) plants, (5) minerals, and (6) the four elements (al-Fārābī KS: 31; PR: 29).
According to the emanation (
fayḍ) process described by al-Fārābī, the existence of every being proceeds from the First Existent (
mawjūd al-awwal), which is perfect, eternal, everlasting, uncaused, free of matter and without form, with no purpose or aim external to itself, with no partner or opposite, and indivisible (al-Fārābī VC: 56–89). The First Existent is distinguished from all other beings due to its oneness, which is its essence. This description seems very close to the Neoplatonic conception of the One, but it is not exactly the same. Al-Fārābī instead argues that, given that this First Existent is not in matter and has no matter, it should be an actual intellect (
‘aql bi’l fi‘l). The First Existent is also intelligible (
ma‘qūl) through its substance, and its identity consists in simultaneously being the act, the subject, and the object of its own intellection (al-Fārābī VC: 70–71). This description is based on Aristotle’s characterization of the unmoved mover in
Metaphysics Lambda as thought thinking itself.
Every existent comes to be, according to al-Fārābī, by the First Existent. This takes place through a sort of expansion or emanation through which the First Existent necessarily gives existence to every being in the universe. Yet this does not imply any addition to its own perfection. In the initial emanation, from the First Existent proceed the second intellects. These intellects themselves, through the apprehension of themselves and the First Existent, are in turn the cause of the celestial bodies. In
The Political Regime al-Fārābī mentions that the number of second intellects or second causes is identical to the number of celestial spheres from the highest, the first heaven, to the last, namely, the sphere of the moon (al-Fārābī KS: 32; PR: 29). In
The Virtuous City he explicitly enumerates nine spheres starting with the first heaven, and then the fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury, and the moon (al-Fārābī VC: 100–105). There is a tenth intellect, namely, the active intellect (
‘aql al-fa ‘‘āl), whose activity is very relevant mainly for two reasons: (1) this intellect governs together with the celestial spheres the sublunary world, and is even involved in the processes of generation and corruption (al-Fārābī LI: 29–30; OI: 75);
[2] (2) furthermore, as will be explained in the fourth section, this intellect also provides the first principles of understanding through which human beings can attain happiness (al-Fārābī VC: 204–205).
Thus far we have explained the first three principles in al-Fārābī’s emanationist model (the First Cause, the second intellects, and the active intellect). The other three principles (the soul, the matter and the form) have in common their connection to the different bodies that comprise the universe. In
The Political Regime al-Fārābī explains these principles following a particular order: first the soul, then the matter, and finally the form; in
The Virtuous City, however, he first explains what matter and form are and subsequently gives a precise account of the soul and its faculties (al-Fārābī VC: 134–163). This latter approach is clearer for two main reasons: (1) the long explanation that al-Fārābī provides concerning the origin of matter from the most imperfect, that is, prime matter, to the most excellent, namely, rational animals, sets forth a precise framework for the understanding of the rational human soul; (2) the explanation concerning the relation between matter and form gives us a better understanding of the relation between body and soul. Matter is the substratum of the form and, hence, the form does not have subsistence by itself since it needs matter; however, matter only exists due to the form (al-Fārābī VC: 108–109).
Concerning the origin and composition of matter, al-Fārābī explains that the circular motion of the celestial spheres generates prime matter (
al-madda al-ūlā), which is common to all bodies in the sublunary world. The four elements proceed from prime matter and, when these elements combine and mix in different ways and undergo the influence of the heavenly bodies, they generate numerous kinds of bodies: minerals, plants, non-rational animals, and rational animals (al-Fārābī VC: 112–115).
[3] Given that matter is the substratum of form, the different forms appear when the combination of the elements takes place, giving rise to different kinds of bodies. As there are different kinds of bodies, there are also different kinds of forms, some of them of lower perfection, as the form of minerals or plants, and others more perfect, as the form of rational animals. This perfection is given by the faculties that each body has according to its natural disposition: while plants have basic faculties such as nutrition or reproduction, rational animals have a higher faculty, the intellect, which enables human beings to attain intelligibles in act.
In
The Political Regime al-Fārābī deals with the relation between matter and form, and explains that form is the actualization of matter in the sense that form is more excellent than matter; however, matter is the substratum of form and without matter there is no form (al-Fārābī KS: 39; PR: 36). As can be seen, al-Fārābī is a partisan of Aristotelian hylomorphism. This relates to his understanding of the soul as the form or actualization of the body and thus perishable with the body. For al-Fārābī, as for Aristotle, the soul is responsible for the capacities or operations of the human body. When referring to the human soul, al-Fārābī holds that the rational part can come to realize itself to such a degree of perfection that it no longer has need of the body, and can come very close to reaching the status of a separate being (al-Fārābī KS: 42; PR: 38). In other words, the rational part is able to separate itself from its other faculties—sensitive, appetitive, and imaginative—in order to attain perfection by transforming itself into an eternal imperishable intellect. As can be seen, al-Fārābī renders an account on the origin of the soul and its faculties by means of a rather complex ontological and cosmological process, through which the human soul progressively attains greater perfection. Nevertheless, before explaining what this perfection consists in, I shall discuss al-Fārābī’s understanding of the faculties of the soul and their function.
[size=30]2. The Soul and its Faculties[/size]
In
The Virtuous City al-Fārābī devotes an entire chapter to the faculties of the human soul, from the most basic and lowest, namely nutrition, to the most perfect and highest, that is, the rational or intellective faculty (al-Fārābī VC: 164–175). Nutrition is shared among plants, animals and human beings; next there is a group of faculties, the external senses (touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight). Animals and human being share these senses. Along with these sensitive faculties there is also the appetitive faculty through which humans and animals experience desire or aversion towards the objects they perceive through the senses. Then, proceeding with the internal senses, there is the imaginative faculty whose function is to retain the sensible impressions when these are no longer present to the external senses. This faculty also has the capacity to combine sensibles with each other, to connect and disconnect them in different compositions and divisions, some of them being false, and some true (al-Fārābī VC: 168–169). The imaginative faculty is also linked to the appetitive faculty given that it is possible to desire imaginative representations. The role of this faculty in human cognition is particularly relevant and is given separate attention in the next section. Last and highest in al-Fārābī’s account is the rational or intellective faculty (
‘aql).
Al-Fārābī gives a complete explanation of the way in which all the faculties of the soul work together. Each faculty has a ruling organ and others that are auxiliaries and subordinates (al-Fārābī VC: 174–187). He holds that the ruling organ in the human body is the heart; the brain is a secondary ruling organ subordinated to the heart; however, all the other organs and limbs are subordinated to the brain. The heart rules every faculty through subordinate organs and limbs. Thus, the ruling organ of nutrition is the heart and the subordinates are the other organs that intervene in the process of nutrition, that is, the stomach, the liver, the spleen, etc. The faculty of sensation is explained following the same model: the heart rules sensation, and its subordinates or auxiliaries are the five senses whose function is to apprehend sensibles. The imaginative faculty is located in the heart and has no auxiliaries distributed in other organs, but it controls what is provided by the five senses. According to al-Fārābī, the imaginative faculty is able to separate and connect what is provided by the five senses in different ways, sometimes attaining an image in agreement with what has been perceived, sometimes something different (al-Fārābī VC: 168–169). Concerning the rational faculty, al-Fārābī explains that it is also located in the heart and has neither auxiliaries nor subordinates, but rules the other faculties, namely, the imaginative, the sensitive, and the nutritive (al-Fārābī VC: 169–171).
The appetitive faculty makes the will (
irāda) arise once the sensitive, the imaginative, or the rational faculties have apprehended something. Appetite, according to al-Fārābī, may be towards knowing or doing a thing, either with the whole body or with some limb or organ. The auxiliaries and subordinates of this faculty are, therefore, all the organs involved in the motion of the body. In other words, the limbs, nerves, and muscles spread throughout the body serve as instruments and subordinates of the appetitive faculty (al-Fārābī VC: 170–171).
Notice that al-Fārābī is following Aristotle according to whom the heart is the center of the biological and even perceptive capacities of animals and human beings. The heart is relevant because it is the source of innate heat or the vital innate spirit, which spreads through the blood vessels sustaining and preserving all the parts of the body. The second major organ, the brain, regulates the heat disseminated by the heart (al-Fārābī VC: 176–177). This innate heat is the principle of life. This biological account helps explain the origin and nature of the soul. In the previous section I explained al-Fārābī’s understanding of the origin and composition of matter and its relation to the form. When referring specifically to the conformity of the human body and the origin of the rational soul, al-Fārābī holds that the conformity of this kind of body with its corresponding set of faculties is only possible when the heat of the heart reaches a certain temperature.
Following Aristotle, al-Fārābī explains the role of the reproductive faculty (al-Fārābī VC: 186–197) in the origin of the body and the soul. He holds that the female prepares the matter while the male prepares the form. Once again, he insists on the centrality of the heart, which provides the matter of the living being through the womb and the form through the organ that generates the semen. The semen, once entering the womb, finds inside of it the blood that had been previously prepared by the womb in order to receive the human form contained in the semen. The semen in turn endows this blood with a capacity that enables the blood to move and start forming the different organs that make up the human body. Hence, the blood from the womb serves as the matter that receives the human form contained in the semen, which is to say that the semen serves as the rennet by which the milk is curdled. Just as the rennet is that by virtue of which fresh milk curdles, while not being part of the curdled milk nor of its matter, so it happens with the semen, which is not part of the clogged blood or of its matter. Hence, the embryo is constituted in the same way that fresh milk is curdled by the action of the curdling principle, that is, the rennet.
When the blood in the womb receives the form from the semen, the first thing that arises is precisely the heart (al-Fārābī VC: 186–187). The other organs in the body emerge only once the rest of the faculties, beginning with the nutritive faculty, are present in the heart. The developing organs include those that are endowed with specifically female or male procreative faculties. Therefore, male and female individuals share all organs but those with reproductive functions and, similarly, both share all the faculties of the soul, that is, the sensitive, the imaginative, and the rational faculties (al-Fārābī VC: 196–197).
All of this detailed biological discussion helps explain the emergence of the perceptive faculties in animals and human beings. Both have sensation so that they can receive the impressions produced by external objects and, through the imaginative faculty, they can retain sensibles while no longer being in contact with the exterior world. Animals are able to react to the external world because they possess sensation and imagination, so they can experience pleasure and pain, or detect those situations that are damaging or dangerous for them. In the case of human beings, in addition to the imaginative faculty, the rational faculty is essential for cognition: human cognition is characterized not by the mere attainment of sensible forms but, rather, by the attainment of intelligibles. Furthermore, it is the faculty through which human beings attain the sciences and the arts, and through which they are able to discern between good habits and good deeds from those that are bad. By this faculty humans are able to reflect on whether something should be done and they can recognize what is useful, pleasant, and harmful (al-Fārābī VC: 165).
The rational faculty is both theoretical and practical (al-Fārābī KS: 32–33; PR: 29–31). In its theoretical aspect, the rational faculty allows humans to attain the knowledge of things that are in a certain way and cannot be otherwise; that is, humans are not able to act upon them or alter them. For example, we cannot do anything to alter the fact that three is an odd number and four an even number (al-Fārābī SA: §7, 15–16). In contrast, in its practical aspect, the rational faculty deals with those things humans can act upon and alter. In this practical dimension, the rational faculty involves skills and calculation. Skills refer to acquired abilities for practicing activities such as carpentry, farming, medicine, or sailing, while calculation is related to those situations where we need to deliberate about something we want to do, when we want to do it, whether it is possible to do it and, if possible, how it should be done (al-Fārābī VC: 208–209; SA: §7, 15–16).
As can be seen, the rational faculty is responsible for human cognition in all its aspects. However, though al-Fārābī gives much importance to this faculty, he also devotes much attention to the imaginative faculty in itself and its interactions with the rational faculty. The two following sections review in more detail the role of the imaginative and the rational or intellective faculties in human cognition, respectively.[/size]
Al-Farabi's Psychology and Epistemology
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