The Naive Realist Theory

3.4.1 The Naive Realist Theory

Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases of perception; cases where one genuinely sees or otherwise perceives an object for what it is. Like sense-datum theorists, and unlike intentionalists, naive realists hold that such experiences themselves consist of relations of awareness to objects. However, like intentionalists, naive realists reject sense-data and appeal instead to ordinary objects. So the naive realist holds, in contrast to both the sense-datum theory and intentionalism (and, adverbialism), that the veridical experiences involved in genuine cases of perception consist, in their nature, of relations to ordinary objects (Level 1). And this is put to work in explaining the phenomenal character of such experiences (Level 2). Take the churchyard covered in white snow and suppose one sees this for what it is. Why is this a case of things appearing white to one? Here the naive realist appeals to the real presence in the experience of the white snow itself. The character of one’s experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.
For the naive realist, the character of the experience one has in seeing the churchyard for what it is is constituted in part by the whiteness of the snow itself and not by the representation of such whiteness where representation is understood as it is by the intentionalist: that is, where an experience’s representation of something as white is something which doesn’t require the presence of an actual instance of whiteness. And many naive realists describe the relation at the heart of their view as a non-representational relation. This means that many naive realists think of experience and its character as non-representational in this sense: (a) intentional content of the sort appealed to by the intentionalists to explain character is not appealed to, and (b) what is fundamental to experience is something which itself cannot explained in terms of representing the world: a primitive relation of awareness to aspects of the world.
But care is needed here, for two reasons. First, neither (a) nor (b) entail that experience is non-representational tout court, that experiences don’t have representational content. For one might think of experience as representational in a way that is not tied to explaining phenomenal character (for instance content might be needed to explain experience’s epistemic role). If one thought of experience as contentful in a way that is not tied to explaining character, that would not be to endorse intentionalism, nor would it be to reject (a) or (b). And second, McDowell (2013) seems to be a naive realist who rejects (b), for he thinks that experience is relational in virtue of being contentful in a certain way—a way which thus contrasts with the way in which experience is contentful on non-relational views such as intentionalism. (For further discussion see the articles in Brogaard (2014)).
The most prominent form of naive realism invokes (a) and (b). Such naive realists assign an important explanatory role to the world itself, without the involvement of content, in explaining the character of veridical experiences. It would be a mistake, however, to think that such naive realists must think of veridical experiences as consisting just in a simple two-place relation between a perceiver and a worldly subject-matter whereby phenomenal character is constituted entirely by the presented subject-matter. This would mean that there could be no variation in the phenomenal character without a variation in the presented subject-matter. But naive realists admit that even holding fixed the presented subject-matter there can be variation in the character of experience. This is worked out in different (but compatible) ways by different theorists. One approach is to keep the simple two-place view, yet note how variations in the perceiver relatum can make for variations in the character of experience (Logue (2012)). Another is to highlight a third-relatum which encapsulates various conditions of perception such as one’s spatiotemporal perspective, perceptual modality, and other conditions of perception variation in which can make for variation in phenomenal character (Campbell (2009), Brewer (2011)). It makes sense to suppose that if a given experience is of a subject-matter from a certain viewpoint (Martin (1998)), or standpoint (Campbell (2009)), then variation in what goes into one having the particular viewpoint or standpoint one has should make for variation in the phenomenal character. And we also need to look at the relation of awareness itself. Many naive realists hold that there can be variation in the way or manner in which one is related to a subject-matter which makes a difference to phenomenal character (Soteriou (2013), Campbell (2014)). Thus naive realists will reject the transparency thesis as it is discussed in §1.1.3, specifically (ii).
Like intentionalists, naive realists want to maintain our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. They hold to both Awareness and Openness. Naive realists think that we are sometimes perceptually aware of ordinary objects: that’s what we have in veridical and illusory experiences (see §3.4.2). Such experiences are cases of such awareness. And perceptual experience satisfies Openness. In veridical and illusory experiences, the character of experience is a presentation of ordinary objects, and is immediately responsive to the character of such objects because such objects are literally involved in the experience, part constitutive of its character.
How, then, does the naive realist respond to the arguments which animate the Problem of Perception?

3.4.2 The Naive Realist Theory and The Argument from Illusion

There are various different approaches available to a naive realist here (see e.g., Fish (2009: Chapter 6), Brewer (2008, 2011: Chapter 5), Kalderon (2011), Genone (2014), Campbell (2014)). But one approach is to target the base case. Naive realists, like intentionalists, can reject the Phenomenal Principle: in illusions it appears to one as if something is F even though one is not aware of anything which is F. When one sees a white wall as yellow, what one is aware of is a white wall, and that is not yellow. So how does naive realism differ from intentionalism about illusions? In two respects: first, naive realists can group illusory experiences with veridical experiences to the extent that they think of them as fundamentally cases of non-representational relations of awareness to ordinary objects. Second, the naive realist can explain the character of such illusory experiences without appeal to intentional content, but instead by appealing to ordinary objects, and their features. On this second difference, one approach is that developed by Brewer:

اقتباس :: visually relevant similarities are those that ground and explain the ways that the particular physical objects that we are acquainted with in perception look. That is to say, visually relevant similarities are similarities by the lights of visual processing of various kinds... very crudely, visually relevant similarities are identities in such things as the way in which light is reflected and transmitted from the objects in question, and the way in which the stimuli are handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our shared training during development (2011: 103)... in a case of visual illusion in which a mind-independent physical object, o, looks F, although o is not actually F, o is the direct object of visual perception from a spatiotemporal point of view and in circumstances of perception relative to which ohas visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F although it is not actually an instance of F (2011: 105).

So though o may not itself be F, it can exist in certain conditions, C, such that it has visually relevant similarities to paradigm F things and in that sense it will objectively look F, or look like an F thing—that is, it will itself have a property, a look or an appearance, independently of anyone actually clapping their eyes upon it (see also Martin (2010), Kalderon (2011) and Genone (2014) on objective looks). If o is then seen in C, o itself will look F to one in perception. Brewer spells this all out in much more detail, and with various examples. One example is seeing a white piece of chalk as red. The chalk is seen in abnormal illumination conditions such that the white piece of chalk itself looks like a paradigm red piece of chalk—it has ’visually relevant similarities with a paradigm piece of chalk, of just that size and shape’ (2011: 106). Given that it is seen in those conditions, it looks red to one, even though it is not in fact red. Here, then, we have an account of illusions in which we appeal to objects and the ways those objects are, not the ways the are represented to be, in explaining character.

3.4.3 The Naive Realist Theory and The Argument from Hallucination

How does the naive realist deal with the argument from hallucination? The naive realist denies its conclusion (C) and unlike the intentionalist wants to deny (C) read as
(C*) veridical experiences are not fundamentally cases of perceptual awareness of ordinary objects.
They accept (A) and so block the argument by rejecting the spreading step (B) ((he Common Kind Assumption (CKA)). Suppose that, as the naive realist holds, when one sees a snow covered churchyard for what it is, one has an experience which is in its nature a relation between oneself and ordinary objects. Whatever an hallucinatory experience as of a snow covered churchyard is, it is not an event with that nature. For such a hallucination could occur quite apart from any relevant worldly items (e.g., in the lab of a scientist manipulating your brain, in a world with no white things). Instead of taking (B) and these facts about hallucinations as grounds to reject the supposition of naive realism, the naive realist instead gives up (B)/(CKA) and thinks of veridical experiences and hallucinatory experiences as of different fundamental kinds. (For a much more nuanced and detailed formulation of the naive realist thinking here, see Martin (2004), (2006)).
In blocking the argument from hallucination in this way the naive realist takes on a disjunctive theory. The theory was first proposed by Hinton (1973) and was later developed by P.F. Snowdon (1979, 1990), John McDowell (1982, 1987) and M.G.F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006). Disjunctivism is not best construed as it is by one of its proponents, as the view “that there is nothing literally in common” in perception and hallucination, “no identical quality” (Putnam (1999: 152)). For both the perception of an X and a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination of an X are experiences which are subjectively indistinguishable from a perception of an X. What disjunctivists deny is that what makes it true that these two experiences are describable in this way is the presence of the same fundamental kind of mental state. Disjunctivists reject what J.M. Hinton calls “the doctrine of the ‘experience’ as the common element in a given perception” and an indistinguishable hallucination (Hinton (1973: 71)). The most fundamental common description of both states, then, is a merely disjunctive one: the experience is either a genuine perception of an X or a mere hallucination of an X. Hence the theory’s name.
But what support is there for the disjunctivist’s rejection of (CKA)? Some defenders of disjunctivism have claimed that there is a relatively simple argument against the (CKA). Putnam, for example, has argued that since the common kind is defined by subjective indistinguishability, and since subjective indistinguishability is not transitive, then it cannot define a sufficient condition for the identity of states of mind, since identity is transitive (Putnam (1999: 130)). The argument that subjective indistinguishability is not transitive derives from the so-called “phenomenal sorites” argument: the possibility that there could be a series of (say) colour samples, arranged in a sequence such that adjacent pairs were subjectively indistinguishable but that the first and last members of the series were distinguishable. Hence sample 1 could be subjectively indistinguishable from sample 2, and so on; and sample 99 could be subjectively indistinguishable from sample 100, but sample 1 nonetheless be subjectively distinguishable from sample 100. Those who want to defend (CKA) need, therefore, to respond to this argument; one way is to follow Graff (2001), and argue that the phenomenal sorites argument is in fact fallacious.

Taking a different approach, Martin (2002: 421) argues that each of the main theories of perception is an “error theory” of perception (in J.L. Mackie’s (1977) sense). That is, each theory convicts common sense of an error about perception: for example, the sense-datum theory convicts common sense of making the erroneous assumption that perception is a direct awareness of mind-independent objects. Against this background, Martin argues that abandoning (CKA) is the least revisionary position among all the possible responses to the Problem of Perception, and thus follows Hinton (1973) in holding the disjunctivist position to be the default starting point for discussions of perception. (A further approach is to be found in McDowell (2008) who attempts to support disjunctivism on epistemological grounds.)

3.4.4 Objections and The Development of Disjunctivism

Naive realism avoids the argument from hallucination by denying (CKA) and thus taking on disjunctivism. But some object to this and try to support (CKA) with a so-called causal argument (Robinson (1994), Martin (2004, 2006), Nudds (2009, 2013)). Why might one think that the kind of event that occurs in a veridical experience of a churchyard occurs in a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination? One way to justify this is with appeal to the idea that the type of brain state which underpins each experiential occurrence is the same; the resulting experiences should thus be of the very same kind. That is, we can suppose that when S sees the snow covered churchyard for what it is, there is some proximal cause of this experience: the experience is preceded by a certain sort of brain state B. But now we can imagine a situation in which we bring about B thus producing an experience in S, yet where B is not brought about through any interaction between S and a snow covered churchyard—e.g., in laboratory conditions. In this scenario S has an hallucinatory experience as of a snow covered churchyard. It is plausible to suppose that these experiences are of the very same kind given that they have the same proximal cause. Thus, (CKA). The point here is that (CKA) looks like a plausible principle forcausally matching veridical and hallucinatory experiences.
This way of motivating (CKA) appeals to a same-cause, same effect principle. That is,
Causal Principle 1: an event e1 is of the same kind as an event e2 if event e1 is produced by the same kind of proximate causal condition as e2 (Nudds 2009: 336).
But the naive realist should reject this principle. As Martin says

اقتباس :: On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. (2004: 56–57).

The naive realist may well admit the possibility of veridical experiences and causally matching hallucinations, but they will resist the idea that sameness of cause implies sameness of the kind of experience involved. This is because there are non-causal conditions constitutive conditionsfor the occurrence of the veridical experience which are not satisfied in the hallucinatory case.
However, as Martin goes on to argue, this defence of (CKA) doesn’t mean that the naive realist is in the clear. For the arguer from hallucination can adopt a different strategy by adopting a modified causal principle:
Causal Principle 2: an event e1 is of the same kind K as an event e2 if event e1 is produced by the same kind of proximate causal condition as e2 in circumstances that do not differ in any non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of an event of kind K (Nudds 2009: 337).
(Martin’s own modified causal principle is more complicated than this in allowing for indeterministic causation. We gloss over this important complication here). Now the arguer from hallucination is taking a different approach by appealing to Causal Principle 2 because this willnot allow the arguer to support (CKA). Take N to be the fundamental kind which characterizes a veridical experience of a snow covered churchyard. Does Causal Principle 2 allow us to say thatN is present in the causally matching hallucinatory case, as (CKA) predicts? No. For the hallucination is produced in circumstances that differ in non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of N given how the naive realist understands N: in the circumstances in which the hallucination comes about there is no appropriate object of perception and that is necessary for the occurrence of N.
So how does Causal Principle 2 help the arguer from hallucination? We have to run an argument from hallucination in “the reverse direction, from what must be true of cases of causally matching hallucinations, to what must thereby be true of the veridical perceptions they match” (Martin 2006: 368). That is, take a hallucination as of a snow covered churchyard h, and suppose that h is of some fundamental kind H. Now we can apply Causal Principle 2 to show that H is present in a causally matching veridical experience of a snow covered churchyard, v For now v is produced by the same kind of proximal cause in circumstances where there is no difference in the non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of an event of kind H. This is because all that is necessary for an occurrence of H is some brain condition, which is present in the circumstances in which v is brought about. This reverse causal argument does not show that v is not of fundamental kind N. What it does show, however, is that whatever fundamental kind is present in a causally matching hallucinatory case will also be present in a veridical case. So even if v is fundamentally N it is also H. That is, we have the Reverse Common Kind Assumption:
(RCKA) Whatever fundamental kind of event occurs when one hallucinates, the very same kind of event also occurs in a causally matching veridical experience.
But now we run into the screening off problem for naive realism (Martin 2004). There is something it is like for S to have an hallucinatory experience as of a snow covered churchyard, and the experience seems to relate the subject to a snow covered churchyard. This fact about the hallucinatory experience is grounded in its being of kind H. But now if an experience of that kind is present in the veridical case, it is difficult to see how what the naive realist says is fundamental to that case, N, is doing anything by way of explaining what it is like for a subject to have the experience (Level 2). Consequently the presence of H in the veridical case seems to make Nexplanatorily redundant. That the veridical experience is H seems to screen off its being N as what explains its phenomenal character.
This is not the end of the road for naive realism, and the way to respond to this problem divides naive realists. The most prominent view is the view of Martin (2004, 2006, 2013). On this view the disjunctivist should conceive of H in a purely negative epistemic way. That is, what makes it the case that one’s hallucinatory experience is as of a snow covered churchyard, with a certain sort of phenomenal character, is just that it is an occurrence which is indiscriminable from—cannot be told apart, introspectively, from—a veridical perception of a snow covered churchyard. The particular subjective perspective that a hallucinator has in a causally matching hallucination as of a snow covered churchyard is explained just by the obtaining of this negative epistemic condition. (Thus, arguably, Dancy’s (1995: 425) demand of the disjunctivist for a positive characterization of hallucination is misplaced, but see Hellie (2013)).
If this is all there is to the nature of H we can see how it can be present in both the hallucinatory and the veridical case: since trivially a veridical experience of a snow covered churchyard is indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a snow covered churchyard. But, crucially, the naive realist can deal with the screening off problem. Does H have a nature which means that the presence of H in the veridical case threatens the explanatory power of N? Plausibly not, for it seems that H’s explanatory force is parasitic on that of N. As Martin notes with his own example:

اقتباس :: But if that is so, then the property of being a veridical perception of a tree never has an explanatory role, since it is never instantiated without the property of being indiscriminable from such a perception being instantiated as well. But if the property of being a veridical perception lacks any explanatory role, then we can no longer show that being indiscriminable from a veridical perception has the explanatory properties which would screen off the property of being a veridical perception (2004: 69).

This, in broad outline, is Martin’s approach and one of the key ways in which disjunctivism is developed out of naive realism. With it, we can see how the idea that subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations satisfy Openness. They are, in their very character, as of ordinary objects which appear to one as there or present. It’s just that what grounds or explains this character is a negative epistemic fact.
Further discussion and development of Martin’s approach is to be found in Nudds (2009, 2013). For naive realists who have different reactions to the screening off problem and thus develop disjunctivism in a different way see Fish (2009), Logue (2012a), and Hellie (2013). For criticism of Martin’s approach see Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006), Farkas (2006), Sturgeon (2008), Siegel (2004, 2008), and Robinson (2013). See Burge (2005) for a general and polemical attack on disjunctivism. For more on disjunctivism, see Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) (2008), Byrne and Logue (eds.) (2009), Macpherson and Platchias (eds.) (2013) and the entry on the disjunctive theory of perception.

4. Conclusion

The Problem of Perception has given rise to a significant ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception: the debate between intentionalists on the one hand, and naive realists and disjunctivists on the other. This is the greatest chasm in the philosophy of perception (Crane 2006). How is it that perceptual experience is an Openness to the mind-independent world? Is it that some such experiences are themselves in their nature non-representational relations to ordinary objects? Or is it that they are in their nature non-relational representations of ordinary objects?

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The Naive Realist Theory

3.4.1 The Naive Realist Theory

3.4.2 The Naive Realist Theory and The Argument from Illusion

The Naive Realist Theory :: تعاليق

3.4.3 The Naive Realist Theory and The Argument from Hallucination

3.4.4 Objections and The Development of Disjunctivism

4. Conclusion

The Naive Realist Theory

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