Self-Forgiveness

Although at least one contemporary author claims that the roots of interpersonal forgiveness are not to be found in Butler's view at all, but, in part at least, in Kantian ethics (Konstan, 2010), the mainstream philosophical understanding of forgiveness many thinkers claim to have derived from Butler's conception seems especially applicable to interpersonal forgiveness. Yet it is a commonplace that people claim to forgive themselves both for wrongs they commit against others, and for self-directed wrongs in the form of some sort of personal failure or shortcoming, such as violating a commitment to another person; or failing to adhere to a diet. Although there seems to be no logical reason to think self-forgiveness as overcoming various forms of self-directed moral reactive attitudes such as disappointment or disgust is fundamentally unlike interpersonal forgiveness as a process, there are significant differences between the two. First, and notwithstanding the fact that people may be angry with themselves, experience self-directed loathing, and struggle to overcome such negative emotional attitudes, it is not clear that the idea of resenting oneself is coherent and, thus, whether forgiveness as overcoming self-referential resentment is possible. This is because resentment in the sense at issue requires such cognitions as that the wrongdoer is a moral agent and the victim a moral subject whose rights are in some way violated by a wrongdoer. That one and the same person is involved simultaneously as agent and subject, wrongdoer and victim, in this drama is incompatible with the idea that resentment is necessarily directed at other people. Indeed, for this and other reasons some thinkers have denied that self-forgiveness is conceptually possible, insisting that forgiveness requires a wrongdoer and another person who is the victim (Arendt, 1958). The matter is further complicated by such questions as what sorts of reactive attitude may be self-directed, what is involved in transcending or disengaging from them and from associated thoughts of oneself as a wrongdoer, what it means to overcome self-directed reactive attitudes for moral reasons, and how self-forgiving is to be distinguished conceptually and morally from self-pardoning and self-condoning. If it is not possible to resent oneself then self-forgiving will not involve the same internal dynamics as does the paradigm case of interpersonal forgiving embraced by many contemporary philosophers. Instead, self-forgiveness may typically involve overcoming such feelings as embarrassment, disappointment, shame, or guilt.
In a different vein, Kathryn Norlock (2009) argues that traumatized people, such as victims of domestic violence or those who suffer from eating disorders, may be regarded as “fragmented” selves who are themselves the source of culpable self-inflicted evils which supports and enables s elf-forgiveness while simultaneously being an impediment to it.
Moreover, modeling self-forgiveness on the standard account of interpersonal forgiveness misleadingly suggests that self-forgiveness is typically a process of overcoming negative reactive attitudes directed towards the self. In this vein, Snow (1992) argues that self-forgiveness serves two important self-regarding purposes. First, it serves the purpose of restoring wrongdoers to full moral agency even in the absence of the victim's forgiveness. This is similar to Holmgren's claim (1998) that self-forgiving is a way of restoring or maintaining one's intrinsic self-worth, which she argues is an extension of her analysis of interpersonal forgiveness. Zenon Szablowinski (2011) concurs, arguing that a failure to self forgive may be detrimental to a wrongdoers moral and psychological well-being, and that such forgiveness is morally appropriate when a wrongdoer's guilt, shame, or self-loathing reach significantly high levels. Second, it constitutes a second-best alternative to full interpersonal forgiveness, in the sense that when full interpersonal forgiveness is not forthcoming (and there can be many reasons for this), self-forgiving is nevertheless an important and sometimes morally appropriate response to having done wrong.
This conception of self-forgiveness as self-rehabilitation assumes that wrongdoers care enough about the wrong they have committed to be in some way impaired by having done it. Though other-directed and self-directed wrongs may be deeply disturbing to the wrongdoer, and require a process of overcoming unhappy self-directed reactive attitudes, wronging others or oneself in a way that is psychologically debilitating to the wrongdoer may be the exception rather than the rule. This is because many of the wrongs we commit are not so grave as to cause us significant distress, even when they cause unhappiness to those who are victimized by those wrongs. Instead of thinking that the many minor inconveniences or offenses we cause others and the self-regarding disappointments we cause ourselves require a forgiveness that involves emotional or characterological transformation, it may be more plausible to suppose such deeds are forgiven by simpler acts such as the thought that I forgive myself. It should also be noted that just as self-forgiveness does not accomplish or require interpersonal forgiveness neither does inter-personal forgiveness accomplish or require self-forgiveness.
Moreover, whether or not anybody other than the victim of wrong can forgive a wrongdoer, it seems clear that nobody other than oneself can forgive self-directed wrongs. And people may wrong themselves in various ways, such as by failing to develop their talents or live up to their principles or commitments. In such cases they may overcome the wrong they have caused themselves and the associated feelings of guilt, remorse, or self-directed anger by forgiving themselves. But the sense in which one may forgive oneself for wronging others is limited to wrongs done to oneself via wronging others. That is, only the wrong done to oneself can be self-forgiven, and not the wrong done to anyone else through the wrongful behavior. For example, suppose X has a sexual encounter outside her marriage, thereby violating her promise of fidelity to her spouse Y. X feels guilty and disappointed in herself, recognizing that she has wronged both her spouse and herself by failing to adhere to her promise. X apologizes for her infidelity, and asks Y for forgiveness, which Y is unable or unwilling to offer because he is emotionally devastated by the betrayal. Faced with the prospect of ongoing guilt and self-directed disappointment there are various ways in which X may move beyond such feelings, including forgiving herself for failing to live up to her own principles. However it remains the case that Xcannot forgive the wrong she did to Y on behalf of Y.

Self-Forgiveness

Self-Forgiveness :: تعاليق

Self-Forgiveness